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INTRODUCTION:

MANAGERIAL NECESSITY IN MASS TORT CASES

Mass tort claims have added new burdens to a tort system that by many
accounts is already strained by run-of-the-mill accident, product defect, and
medical malpractice cases. With the new burdens have come more complaints
about the performance of the tort system generally, and more proposals for
its reform. That few of the complaints or proposals are new is unremarkable.
The outpouring of critiques over the past thirty years has been such that the
appearance of a significant new idea would be cause for considerable
surprise-and even suspicion-on the common sense notion that if the
proposal were really sound, it would have been discovered earlier.
This is not to say that the mass tort phenomenon has not generated some
useful information on and insights into both the workings and the limitations
of the tort system. Of particular value is the information that mass tort claims
have provided about practical claims administration. The academic literature
on tort law has tended to focus heavily on theoretical and doctrinal issues, to
the relative neglect of practical issues of claims administration. These
practical issues traditionally have not been of large concern to tort scholars
mainly because, in the ordinary accident case, the details of paying judgments
are matters of ministerial routine, determined by the court or by the parties
without reported dispute or formality. Even when there are multiple plaintiffs
or defendants, these management details usually have not posed important
theoretical or practical problems of the kind noticed in legal scholarship.
The advent of large-scale mass tort claims, however, represented most
importantly by the asbestos, Agent Orange, and Dalkon Shield cases, has
shifted attention to the management side of tort claims.' For the most part,
the theoretical and doctrinal issues in these cases are familiar to the tort
system from traditional, and frequently quite ordinary, cases. Admittedly, the
causation problems in some of the mass tort cases have been unusually
Copyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems
*
Class of 1962 Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
*
John C. Stennis Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
We thank Ian Ayres, Lynn Baker, Charles Goetz,John Monahan, John McCoid, Jeffrey O'Connell,
David Rosenberg, George Rutherglen, Peter Swire, Laurens Walker, and participants in a workshop
at the University of Virginia for helpful comments and discussion.
I. For extensive explorations of the management side of mass tort litigation, see generally
Francis E. McGovern, Resolving M'ature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 BU L Rev 659 (1989); Francis E.
McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U Chi L Rev 440 (1986).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 53: No. 4

difficult, involving issues of fundamental scientific uncertainty. In the
asbestos and Agent Orange cases, for instance, the necessary reliance on
epidemiological evidence has introduced a new complexity not found in
conventional accident cases. Yet this characteristic does not distinguish mass
tort claims. The causation issue in the Dalkon Shield litigation is
fundamentally the same as that in many product liability or medical accident
cases. 2 Trite though it may be to observe, the distinguishing feature of most
mass tort claims lies in the number of claims and the cost of adjudicating such
claims within the traditional common law framework of individualized
adjudication.
It also warrants notice that use of the single phrase "mass tort" obscures a
huge difference between two classes of cases. The first class contains cases in
which the number of claimants is between a few hundred and several
thousand. In the past decade, there have been roughly a dozen such cases,
including the MGM Grand Hotel fire litigation, 3 DES suits, 4 toxic shock

syndrome cases, 5 the Bendectin litigation,6 and the Hyatt Regency Hotel
skywalk litigation. 7 The second class contains the cases involving hundreds of
thousands of claimants. There have been only three such mega-tort actions:
the Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and asbestos litigation." This latter class of
cases presents a critical problem for the tort system. As difficult as it has been
to handle the former class of cases, traditional processes can do so after a
fashion. In contrast, conventional methods of processing tort suits are wholly
inadequate to handle hundreds of thousands of claimants. The logistics of
mass claims administration dictated that something be done to make
processing such claims manageable, and legal ingenuity has responded,
developing distinctive processes for each setting.
To date, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and asbestos are the only cases in
which there was simply no choice but to employ special claim processes.
However, partly by osmosis, and partly because of the sense that gains could
be had from employing special claim processes even when doing so was not
an undeniable necessity, similar approaches have been adopted in a number
of the smaller mass tort cases as well. Although there is much to be said for
engaging in such experimentation, the time has come for a more conscious
examination of the premises that lie behind the adoption of special
procedures for processing mass tort claims. In our view, these premises are
2. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L & Contemp Probs 79
(Autumn 1990).
3. In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litigation, 570 F Supp 913 (D Nev 1983).
4. For example, Sindell v Abbott Labs., 26 Cal 3d 588, 607 P2d 924 (1980).
5. For example, Kehm v Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F2d 613 (8th Cir 1983).
6. See In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F2d 290 (6th Cir 1988).
7. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 FRD 380 (WD Mo 1983) (approving settlement). See also In re
Three Mile Island Litigation, 557 F Supp 96 (MD Pa 1982).
8. These actions have involved, respectively, approximately 125,000, 210,000, and 340,000
claimants. In contrast, there have been approximately 2,000 DES claimants, 1,000 claimants
associated with the fire at the MGM Grand Hotel, and 2,000 Bendectin claimants. See Am Bar Ass'n,
Report of the Commission on Mass Torts 15e (1989).
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controversial and debatable. Accordingly, the move from employing special
procedures when doing so is necessary to employing them whenever feasible
is too important to escape careful analysis. In the following discussion, we
analyze some of the obstacles to settlement of mass tort claims, and we
propose a new mechanism-aggregative valuation of claims at trial-to help
transform the process of adjudicating and settling mass tort claims.
II
FROM NECESSITY TO VIRTUE

Until quite recently, the attention given to innovative techniques for
handling mass claims in the judicial system has been focused on procedural
mechanisms for centralizing jurisdiction over the claims. Consolidation of
claims in class actions is one vehicle for such centralizing; 9 consolidation of
cases for pretrial processes and facilitating settlements is another.1 0 Both
types of consolidation are important means of achieving efficiencies in the
adjudication of mass claims. The mere consolidation of claims or cases,
however, is only partially responsive to the problems presented by cases like
the Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and asbestos actions. The central problem
in all of these cases does not lie only in the resolution of the front-end
questions of liability and general causation that consolidation is designed
primarily to facilitate. Rather, the sticking point in these cases often lies in the
back-end allocation of awards to individual claimants once liability and
general causation have been established. Consolidation of claims by itself
does little to solve this problem. Further innovation is plainly needed.
Until now, the focus of most of the innovation has been on managerial
techniques for processing, evaluating, and settling claims, and on the use of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") procedures for claims that do not
settle. These techniques are fairly conventional and largely unexceptionable.
All are limited, however, by the boundaries set by the parties themselves;
none attempts to modify the basic process by which disputed claims ultimately
are adjudicated. The architects of these techniques appear to have assumed
that the conventional common law trial procedures for adjudicating disputes
cannot be effectively changed in ways that would materially improve the
9. Courts have been resistant to class actions in mass tort cases because of differences among
plaintiffs regarding individual causation and injury. See David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings
in Mass 7ort Cases: Lessons From a Special Master, 69 BU L Rev 695, 696 (1989). However, under the
burden of mass tort cases, this attitude appears to be changing, and courts are becoming bolder
about certification of classes for generic issues. See, for example,Jenkins v Raymark Indus., 782 F2d
468 (5th Cir 1986); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 100 FRD 718 (ED NY 1983).
10. In the federal courts, consolidation of cases within a particular district may be ordered under
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consolidation of cases in different districts may
be ordered by the Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation according to 28 USC § 1407.
Consolidation of the Agent Orange cases, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, MDL No 381
(JPMDL May 8, 1979) (unpublished order), is probably the most noteworthy illustration of the
manner in which such consolidation can be used not only for pretrial processes but also to facilitate
settlement.
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disposition of individual claims when managerial or consensual techniques
fail. If this is the assumption, it should not go unchallenged.
Some of the settlement techniques also offer hope for important reforms
in the conduct of formal claims adjudication. Especially noteworthy is the use
of statistical claims profiles in evaluating individual claims, a technique
explored (in practice and in scholarship) by Francis McGovern"I and outlined
2
by Kenneth Feinberg in his discussion of the Dalkon Shield Option 3 plan.'
Essentially the strategy is to promote settlement of claims by presenting
information to the parties on the valuation of similar claims in prior
settlements and/or adjudications. Such a profile provides an indication of the

amounts paid, in judgment or settlement, to different categories of claimants.
These categories are defined as functions of certain variables that affect
liability and the severity and duration of a claimant's injury or illness.' 3 Of
course, statistical valuation here is at least implicitly, if not explicitly, a
function of both probability and payout. More precisely, it is the set of
probabilities of different payouts ranging from zero (no liability or no injury)
to some upper limit (liability and positive damages up to an amount where the
probability of award approaches zero).
This settlement strategy assumes that rational parties are kept from
reaching settlement primarily by their different valuations of a claim, and that
these different valuations in turn reflect different predictions of the
probability and size of an award if the case is adjudicated. The trick, then, is
to reduce these disparate valuations, which can be done by presenting profiles
of awards in similar cases to both sides. This can be viewed as an attempt to
construct a "market value" for the claims. Since the sale of tort claims to third
persons is prohibited virtually everywhere, the development of an objective
market valuation for such claims is precluded."4 Absent a true claims market,
statistical claims profiles constitute an alternative source of objective
valuation.
Of course, the effectiveness of this "surrogate market valuation" is
dependent on the parties having a genuine interest in settling the claim on the
basis of market value. Where this is the case, the convergence of the parties'
respective valuations is expected to produce settlement; parties will settle

when the difference in their valuations is smaller than the expected cost of
11. McGovern, 69 BU L Rev 659 (cited in note 1); 53 U Chi L Rev 440 (cited in note 1). See also
Mark A. Peterson, New Tools for Reducing Civil Litigation Expenses (RAND, 1983).
12. Feinberg, 53 L & Contemp Probs at 107-09 (cited in note 2).
13. Francis McGovern has reported that in Jenkins v Raymark Indus., 782 F2d 468 (5th Cir 1986),
"fewer than ten variables accounted for 90% of the variation among case values." Francis E.
McGovern, The Cycle of Mass Tort Litigation (Yale Program in Civil Litigation Working Paper No 122,
May 1990).
14. See MarcJ. Shukaitis, A Market in PersonalInjury Tort Claims, 16J Legal Stud 329, 329 (1987).
Shukaitis proposes free assignability of claims. He argues that this would increase both the
likelihood and amount of payment to victims, but this is by no means inevitable. As to the likelihood
of payment, a market could, as Shukaitis notes, make it easier for plaintiffs to realize on a claim;
however, market valuation would also discourage insubstantial claims that are pursued simply
through ignorance of their "true" (market) value. A market valuation would also constrain plaintiffs'
overvaluation of claims just as it would defendants' undervaluation.
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litigation. 1 5 It is obvious, however, that whether parties litigate or settle is
determined not merely by their respective valuation of the claim and the cost
of the two options. Strategic considerations, including idiosyncratic
preferences not measured by ordinary information about the market value of
a claim, often play a large role in whether parties settle or litigate. 1 6 It is
notoriously true that defendants who face large exposure to multiple claims
may adopt a strategy of litigating claims regardless of their individual value to
discourage future claims or to encourage more favorable settlements. It is
equally notorious that plaintiffs-more precisely, plaintiffs acting through
their attorneysl 7 -may hold out against settlement at fair value, choosing
instead to play a lottery with litigation. In effect this choice reflects a
preference, usually the attorney's preference, for risk: the small probability of
a large payoff is preferred to the claim's expected value. Notice that if such
strategic objectives defeat settlement efforts, they are just as likely to frustrate
attempts to implement ADR inasmuch as ADR depends on consent.
This tendency of plaintiffs and their attorneys suggests that ways must be
found to influence the strategic incentives of the parties. One obvious way to
do so would be to change the underlying substantive law. For instance,
limiting the amount of recoverable non-economic damages, such as pain and
suffering or punitive damages, would surely reduce plaintiffs' incentive to play
the lottery with claims. The possibility of jury awards in excess of the
objectively expected value of the claim is most sharply reduced by excluding
or limiting those items of damages that cannot be objectively measured and
are most likely to be exaggerated by juror subjectivity. For the moment,
however, we wish to set to one side changes in either liability or compensation
rules in order to focus on evidentiary approaches that might reduce strategic
behavior and thereby promote settlement.
A.

Claim Profiles as Evidence

An important first step in promoting settlement would be to permit the
claim profiles used in settling claims to be employed in formal adjudication as
well. The most modest use would be to permit a profile to be introduced as
statistical evidence that the trier of fact-a jury in virtually all of these casescould consider in evaluating the claim. These profiles would likely be
constructed, under the auspices of the courts, by statisticians and other
technically qualified experts under the direction of special masters. The
profiles would be defined only by "legally relevant" factors: the
15.

See, for example, McGovern, 53 U Chi L Rev at 483 (cited in note 1). For more detail on the

basic model, see Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.5 (Little Brown, 3d ed 1986).
16. See Rosenberg, 69 BU L Rev at 705-06 (cited in note 9). On the role of strategic behavior in
settlement negotiations generally, see Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11J Legal Stud 225 (1982).
17. In mass tort cases, it is inevitable that plaintiffs' lawyers, representing large numbers of
victims, will make settlement or litigation choices and that such choices will reflect their own
preferences as much or more than those of their clients. Of course, a lawyer's personal valuation of
each individual claim necessarily differs from that of the client to the extent it is only a part of a large
portfolio of claims having different expected values.
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characteristics of claims or claimants that the finder of fact in any individual
trial may consider in making determinations of liability, causation, and
damages. For example, in cases in which the asserted basis of liability is the
failure to warn of an unavoidably dangerous quality in a product, profiles
might take into account variations in different claimants' independent
knowledge of the dangerous properties of the product in question if data
showed that such differences in information were correlated with variations in
earlier awards and settlements. Similarly, in a toxic exposure case, such data
might show that awards and settlements varied with the type of disease the
plaintiff had contracted and with the probability that contracting different
diseases was a result of exposure to a substance produced by the defendant.
In such cases, it would be permissible to define profiles by reference to
differences in the variation in the severity of the diseases as well as the causal
probabilities of contracting these different diseases.
In contrast, it would be impermissible to define the profiles by reference to
legally irrelevant factors such as the race, gender, or religion of the claimant,
even if data revealed that differences among claimants in these respects
actually had affected recoveries in earlier awards and settlements in the same
litigation. Although any such differences would be captured by the data
aggregated in a given profile, the profile would tend to average the
differences, evenly distributing the effect of a legally irrelevant factor among
all persons whose claims fit the profile. For example, black and white
claimants falling within a particular profile would be entitled to the same
award, notwithstanding that, other things being equal, blacks had recovered
less (or more) than whites in the cases upon which the profile had been based.
By using only legally relevant factors to define the profiles, the risk that legally
irrelevant factors had affected the earlier awards and settlements would be
distributed equally among all claimants within a particular profile.
Although employing claim profiles formulated in this manner may seem
unconventional, the use of statistical evidence has become routine in modern
tort cases on questions of liability, causal responsibility, and damages. For
instance, epidemiological studies have been the acknowledged basis for
establishing general causation in a number of toxic exposure cases.' 8 Such
evidence is not only relevant but necessary in certain cases. 19 Moreover, even
in ordinary tort cases involving permanent injury, the calculation of future
damages is heavily dependent on general statistics concerning, for example,
life expectancy, economic earnings, and medical costs. In making each
calculation, the trier of fact necessarily draws inferences from general
statistical evidence on the value of a particular claim. Under our proposal, the
18. See Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical
Evidence, 96 Yale LJ 376, 379 (1986) (authored by Steve Gold).
19. See, for example, Brock v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 874 F2d 307, 313, modified, 884
F2d 166 (5th Cir 1989), cert denied, 110 S Ct 1511 (1990) (absence of conclusive epidemiological
evidence fatal to claim that Bendectin caused birth defects); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation, 818 F2d 187, 193-94 (2d Cir 1987) (summary judgment affirmance against nonsettling
plaintiffs based partially on absence of epidemiological evidence linking Agent Orange to injuries).

Page 137: Autumn 1990]

AGGREGATIVE VALUATION

trier of fact would draw the same kind of inference from the statistical
evidence summarized in a claim profile. Of course, there are differences
between the statistical evidence used in conventional tort cases and mass tort
claim profile data. The most obvious difference is that the profiles do not
represent any objective reality; rather, they are a collection of opinions (those
of juries or settling parties in prior cases) as to the value of a particular type of
claim, and, legally, they are hearsay opinions that are generally inadmissible
into evidence.
We can quickly push aside the hearsay objection. The profiles are hearsay,
of course, since they are comprised of what out-of-court declarants (juries or
settling parties in other cases) have (implicitly) asserted to be the value of a
particular type of claim. All statistical evidence generally is hearsay, however,
insofar as it depends on the credibility of persons who put together the
underlying observations contained in the statistics. Despite its status as
hearsay, statistical evidence is routinely used either directly or as a basis for
20
expert testimony.
The more substantial objection to the introduction of the model profiles is
relevance. The argument against admission is that the opinions of prior juries
or settling parties as to the value of certain types of claims have no relevance
to the particular claim before the court. In part this argument rehashes an old
debate about the extent to which disputed issues in a particular case can be
resolved by reference to general probabilities (reflected in statistics or simply
in intuited generalities, such as in the case of res ipsa loquitur) or can be
decided only on "particularistic evidence." More than enough has been
written on this subject. 2 ' It is enough for us to record summarily our view
that the objections to probabilistic proof rest on an exaggerated distinction
between general probability and "particularistic" evidence. In all but the
simplest case, determinations about particular facts depend on inferences
drawn from generalized knowledge and hence on general probability. In fact,

20. See, for example, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F Supp 670, 683 (SD NY
1963). Of course, there is no generic exception to the hearsay rule for statistical data as such, but
such data is generally part of regularly kept records or learned writings for which exceptions are
provided. See, for example, In re "Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F Supp 1223, 1240-41
(ED NY 1985). Such data also can be used by testifying experts without regard to its hearsay status
provided it is of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field. Id at 1245. See generally Edward
W. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence chs 31-33 (West, 3d ed 1984).
21. Some idea of the fascination the subject of probabilistic proof has held for commentators
can be gleaned from the nearly 600 pages devoted to it in Symposium, Probability and Inference in the
Law of Evidence, 66 BU L Rev 377 (1986). See also Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On
JudicialProof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv L Rev 1357, 1358 n5 (1985) (citing sources). This
lavish attention has not discouraged further comment. See, for example, Daniel Shaviro, StatisticalProbability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 Harv L Rev 530 (1989). In the specific field of
torts, the debate about probabilistic proof has centered on causation issues. See, for example, Glen
0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va L Rev 713 (1982); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97
Harv L Rev 849 (1984); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Calif L Rev 1737 (1985).
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it is difficult to imagine how a mass tort case would be adjudicated without
22
probabilistic inferences drawn from general data.
To be sure, not all data are equally useful, not all probabilities equally
strong, and not all permissible inferences equally relevant. Even
acknowledging the general use of statistics and probabilistic proof to
determine such questions as general causation (for example, asbestos causes
mesothelioma), some will no doubt object that the disposition of similar tort
claims by prior juries or parties is simply irrelevant to the disposition of any
other claim. However, legal relevance is not a free-standing proposition of
pure logic; it is always tied to an accepted convention or rule about what the
basis for a legal claim should be. The relevance objection to the admissibility
of claim profile data rests on the assumption that every claim is unique and
that its value therefore must be determined without reference to the value of
any other claim, no matter how similar.
Although this is a fairly conventional assumption about the way common
law adjudications are supposed to work, it is not a sacred principle of the tort
system or of the common law that every claim be completely independent of
the results of other claims. Over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes
argued that courts should be permitted to crystallize, into more or less fixed
rules of law, the accumulated findings of juries on certain commonly
occurring issues. 23 His notion has never taken hold in ordinary common law
adjudication, in part because of the perceived variousness of common law
claims and because of general concerns about invading the province ofjuries.
Neither of these concerns seems very compelling in the context of mass claims
adjudication. That we permit collective determinations of common legal and
factual issues in class actions and in consolidated cases indicates that there is
nothing sacrosanct about individualized adjudication. In the mass tort
context, individual determinations are usually unavailable for plaintiffs;
settlement therefore is a practical necessity. Being relegated to settlement,
these plaintiffs are also relegated to some form of aggregative claims
valuation. The same conditions that preclude trial of most such claims also
preclude individualized negotiation. The use of claim profiles would extend
recognition of this imperative to formal adjudication.
Admittedly, transplanting statistical valuation from settlement to
adjudication presents a conceptual problem not confronted in voluntary
settlement. As statistical artifacts, the valuations aggregate determinations of
liability, causation, and injury that are formally separate in adjudication. In
ordinary adjudication, juries are not asked to determine the "value" of a claim
22. Our proposal contemplates that plaintiffs rest their case on manifest injury and not on mere
risk of future injury. Analytically, measuring the expected value of a claim is the same for both types.
In fact, even conventional, actual injury cases typically involve measuring probabilistic elements such
as the extent of future damage. See Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensationfor
Tortious Risk, 14 J Legal Stud 779, 779-81 (1985). For present purposes, however, we make the
simplifying assumption that the expected value calculation is for injuries that have become, in whole
or in part, manifest at the time of suit.
23. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 98-99 (M. Howe, 1963; original ed 1881).
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on the basis of the claim's distinct elements; rather, they are asked first to
determine whether the facts support liability, causal relationship, and injury,
and, if so, then to proceed to value the injury. Profile valuations conflate
these two types of determinations into a single question of valuation. This
aggregation is not unfamiliar to juries, however, as they often informally mix
these issues, for instance, by making adjustments in awards based on degrees
of certainty about liability or causation. Moreover, it should be emphasized
that we are dealing with the "back-end" of the mass tort case. The general
questions of liability, or fault, and generic causation have already been
determined for the general class of cases. While issues may remain
concerning an individual plaintiff's own fault or contribution to her injury, the
predominating factor in "back-end" controversies is the existence and
amount of injury-a conventional valuation question.
A more serious difficulty is that developing reliable claim profiles could
entail methodological difficulties that can be finessed in consensual
settlement, where parties can make their own discount for any methodological
infirmities they detect. One concern is that the profiles might be skewed by
earlier parties' strategic choices in settling or litigating claims. Though this
possibility cannot be overlooked, it is not a substantial obstacle to the use of
claim profiles. Any strategic moves of one party can be checked by
countermoves of the other. As repeat players, defendants would naturally
have the greatest incentive (and ability) to engage in such moves. Sometimes,
however, plaintiffs' lawyers are also repeat players because they represent
thousands of claimants; then they too would have the incentive (and ability) to
manipulate settlement or litigation of some claims for the benefit of others.
Moreover, attempts to manipulate the database of the claim profiles are
unlikely to be worth the effort unless the party can be assured of having a
significant effect on the ultimate shape of the profiles. If the database is large,
this would be difficult to accomplish. Recalling our market analogy earlier,
one can think of the task as being roughly comparable to the conditions for
setting prices in the market: a buyer/seller must have monopoly power or be
a member of an effective and durable cartel in the "market" of relevant
claims, or attempts to manipulate the market will fail.
Strategic concerns aside, skeptics will undoubtedly be able to identify
other problems in constructing reliably representative claims data. For
instance, mixing settlements and adjudicated awards in the data base might
present a problem to the extent they contain different valuation biases. 24 We
24. For instance, there is the possibility of a selection bias in the kinds of claims that are litigated
which would also bias those valuations. Priest and Klein have argued that as the parties' estimates of
the probability of the outcome approach the decision standard, the difference in their expected
values of the claim increase, thereby making litigation more likely. See generally George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984). The theory has
prompted a controversy that we cannot pursue here. The implications of the theory for our purposes
are not clear to us, since the Priest-Klein model deals with differences in probability estimates of
outcome, not valuation.
Apart from the possibility of a Priest-Klein selection bias, jury valuations in adjudicated cases are
likely to show greater dispersion than settlement values. However, settlement valuation should take
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cannot pursue these methodological problems further here. It is enough to
note that questions of methodology would be the subject of ajudicial hearing.
We do not propose to allow every plaintiff to challenge the general features of
the profiles; this would defeat the purpose of the exercise by threatening to
transform every claim adjudication into a trial of statistical methods if not a
game of jury confusion. Instead, courts should hold a separate hearing on all
of the profiles in order to yield a definitive determination of the validity of
methodology and general relevance to the classes of claims to which they will
be applied. 2 5 There is precedent for such a separate hearing on legal and
26
general factual issues in mass tort cases.
B.

Weighing the Evidence

Once it is decided that statistical profiles can be considered by the jury, it
becomes necessary to decide what weight may be given to them. If the
profiles were considered simply as evidence, juries, in their (more or less)
unfettered discretion, would be free to give the profiles such force as they
considered appropriate. Leaving the jury wholly free to act on its discretion,
however, would be somewhat at odds with our basic premise that
unconstrained jury determinations produce excessive variation in claim
valuations. In optimistic moments, we think that allowing juries to consider
claim profiles might make juries more skeptical about apparently idiosyncratic
claims. We cannot be confident, however, that self-enforced jury restraint
would prevail. It may be useful, therefore, to consider giving the profiles
special legal authority by making them presumptive of the value of each claim
within the class to which the profile applies.
Giving rebuttably presumptive weight to profiles would be only marginally
more radical than allowing them to be used simply as evidence. 27 The
into account the full range of adjudicated valuations to the extent they have statistical significance. A
more serious bias is that the settlement data will incorporate nuisance payments which, some might
argue, should be excluded in using the valuations in court.
25, This is within the spirit of a more general, and more ambitious, suggestion by Walker and
Monahan for establishing the authority of social research findings. See Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va L Rev 559 (1987). Although
Walker and Monahan suggest that general social science findings can be introduced through
independent judicial investigation and briefs from the parties, id at 588, we assume that some kind of
structured hearing would be required to review the claim profiles. We need not here consider
whether this separate hearing would entail a jury. Although we are very skeptical about the value of a
jury trial on highly technical issues of statistical validity, our principal concern is to have a single
adjudication of generic issues of validity and class relevance.
26. See, for example, In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F2d 290 (6th Cir 1988); Jenkins v Raymark
Indus., 782 F2d 468 (5th Cir 1986). We leave unanswered the question whether it would be possible
to have a single hearing covering claims in different courts. Such a determination probably would
not be within the ken of a federal court in which cases had been consolidated for pretrial proceedings
under 28 USC § 1407. However, it should be possible to consolidate all the cases filed within a
single district for purposes of such a hearing. In the case of bankrupt defendants (as in the case of
Manville or A.H. Robins), the court with bankruptcy jurisdiction could make such a central
determination.
27. Our use of a presumption here is roughly comparable to Walker and Monahan's proposal to
have courts instruct juries on "social framework" information relevant to a particular adjudication.
See Walker & Monahan, 73 Va L Rev at 592-98 (cited in note 25).
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approach can be justified by the conventional criteria for the use of
presumptions: a combination of probative power, judicial convenience, and
public policy. 28 The probative power of a specific claim profile would
obviously depend on the soundness of the methodology, the depth of the
database, and the quality of the analysis supporting it. We make no assertions
about these factors in the abstract; as indicated above, they would all be
subject to close judicial scrutiny in a special hearing. Judicial convenience
would be enhanced to the extent that the use of presumptions generally
discourages parties from using litigation as a lottery or for other strategic
purposes. For instance, plaintiffs seeking to show that their claims fall outside
the range of valuation shown by a particular profile would be put to a special
burden of proof, which might or might not increase the cost of litigation but
certainly would decrease the probability of success (that is, success in
obtaining a recovery in excess of the "normal" value of their type of claim).
There is also a correlative public policy rationale for employing a
presumption in this context. That is, discouraging the strategic use of
litigation is in the public interest. Moreover, insofar as use of the
presumption tended to reduce variance in awards, the presumption would
also promote the independent public policy value of evenhandedness.
We recognize that this last assertion is controversial. Aggregative
valuation pits two policies against each other. On the one hand, the right to
individualized treatment is a traditional feature of the common law system
and one of its most valued characteristics. On the other hand, this same right
also produces disparate outcomes that cannot be accounted for by intrinsic
differences in the underlying claims. As noted above, critics have often
remarked that the common law system of tort claims adjudication is an
unprincipled lottery.2 9 Whether or not that characterization is completely
accurate, it can hardly be denied that there is randomness in outcomes and
that this randomness is in substantial degree a function of insisting that each
claim be valued in isolation from any other. Any such randomness must be
seen as a flaw in the system that undermines the system's accuracy and
30
fairness.
28. See Robinson, 68 Va L Rev at 731-32 (cited in note 21). A more numerous catalog of
reasons appears in Edmund M. Morgan, 1 Basic Problems of Evidence 31-33 (ALI, 1954), but these
reasons can be distilled into the above three.
29. See, for example, Jeffrey O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery: Only the Lawyers Win (Free Press,
1979); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 Cal L Rev 555, 594 (1985); Marc A.
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 Va L Rev 774, 778
(1967). It is not academic critics alone who have complained of the chance element in tort litigation.
Commenting on two jury verdicts in asbestos cases tried before him, a Philadelphia trial judge
remarked that the verdicts made the litigation "more like roulette than jurisprudence." Quoted in
Deborah R. Hensler, et al, Asbestos in the Courts: The Challenge of Mass Toxic Torts 42 (RAND, 1985).
30. The fairness objection rests on the venerable principle of treating like claims equally. What
we describe as "accuracy" rests on the same principle. It is true, of course, that any aggregative
treatment of claims can undermine accuracy in the sense of being insensitive to differences among
individual claims, but it is important to understand that the present system is inaccurate in the other
direction to the extent it implicitly recognizes differences that are either not grounded in objective
reality or should not be recognized. Average values are not necessarily more appropriate or "true"
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Admittedly, the proposal that claim profiles carry a presumption is
awkward. The basic idea would be to instruct juries to do two things: first, to

determine which of the prespecified profiles most nearly represents the
particular claim, and, second, to award damages equal to or within some
defined interval around the median claim value 3' of the relevant profile,
unless the plaintiff or the defendant shows that the particular claim cannot be
fairly represented by any of the profiles. Ordinarily, of course, the effect of
such a presumption would be to impose on the party against whom it runs (in
this case it would run against both parties) the burden of producing credible
evidence to rebut the presumed fact. 32 However, such an effect would not
promote our aim of suppressing individualized determinations, whether on
liability, causation, or damages. Given that the profile represents a class of
claims, rebutting the presumption would require no more than the
production of individualized evidence that would be routinely submitted
anyway. In short, a simple rebuttable presumption in this context might have
very little effect.

Nevertheless, the language of presumption might still be used to instruct
the jury that it should adhere to the profile valuation absent some special
showing that it is inappropriate for the particular claim. In effect, the jury
would be instructed that the profile is to be used in evaluating the claim unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff's claim is special.
Strictly speaking, then, the "presumption" in this case is not a true
presumption, in the sense of shifting the burden of production, but is rather a
means of articulating a different standard of proof. However, the language of
presumption is still suitable to suggest the effect of introducing a claim
profile. Where appropriate, a court could enforce the presumption by
33
overturning a jury's award.
In principle at least, the effectiveness of this sort of presumption could be
tested by observing the pattern of awards to see if it differs significantly from
the profiles. If the profiles have the desired effect, claims falling clearly within
the profiles would be settled more frequently than those in which the profile
could be rebutted. Consequently-and somewhat counterintuitively-the
more frequently awards at trial fell within the relevant profile, the less likely it
in some deep ontological sense. But in this context, average values can correct for extremes of
distribution that are caused by the extremes of subjectivity.
31. Instructing the jury to restrict awards in this manner would force the jury to disregard
extreme cases within the profile. If the profile were merely used as evidence, presumably the jury
should consider the entire distribution of valuations contained in the claim profile. However, insofar
as the purpose of the presumption here is to constrain jury discretion, that purpose could be
undermined ifjuries were permitted to fix their awards at the extremes of the distribution contained
in the profile.
32. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence at 344 (cited in note 20).
33. It has been suggested to us that a judge might forewarn the parties that ajury award outside
the profile would cause him to order a new trial. The purpose of such a communication would be to
encourage last-minute settlement. However, we are somewhat skeptical of the value of promoting
settlements after evidence is taken. What we are trying to develop is a rule that will signal to parties before
trial and to juries at trial that awards deviating from some prescribed range of values will be accepted
only in specially compelling cases.
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would be that the presumption was working effectively in promoting
settlement. If no significant change in the pattern of jury awards were
observed, it might be necessary to look for more radical means of conforming
jury determinations to some collective valuation.
C.

Fixed Awards

As long as settlement profiles are used only as evidence, or even as a
rebuttable presumption of the value of plaintiffs' claims, our proposal may be
seen as making only a modest change in the existing structure of mass tort
claims administration. Under our proposal, the parties would be free to settle
or not, and juries would have the same power as in conventional cases to
make the award they considered correct. However, because profiles would be
admitted into evidence and, under our stronger proposal, be rebuttably
presumed a correct reflection of the value of the plaintiff's claim, the parties
would be encouraged to reach a settlement governed by the relevant profile.
Indeed, creating this incentive is an important purpose of the proposal, which
is designed to promote voluntary settlement of individual mass tort claims.
Nevertheless, it would be disingenuous for us to claim that our proposal is
merely a strategy for encouraging settlement. Although it undoubtedly will
do just that, it would do so by altering both parties' substantive rights to the
extent that the value of the asserted claim becomes more or less fixed by the
profiles of other claims. The change in the parties' formal rights at trial also
limits their freedom to reject settlement. Having come this far from
traditional common law processes, it is natural to ask whether even more farreaching modification of the rules governing liability and damages in mass
tort cases would be appropriate. For instance, if our aim of limiting jury
discretion in making awards is sensible, why not further limit jury discretion?
Our concern about the possible ineffectiveness of a rebuttable presumption
could easily be solved by making claim profiles dispositive of individual
claimis. The rebuttable presumption then becomes a fixed schedule of
damages-in effect an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption about the value
of the plaintiff's claim.3 4 Under this further limitation, the jury's only job
would be to determine which profile best represents a particular claim. Of
course, such a complete collectivization of claims adjudication would radically
change the common law system and would probably require legislative
authorization. As this is written, a federal trial court in Texas (Judge Parker)
has implemented such a collective scheme for a class of some 2300 parties,
based on a trial of selected claims that represented the different disease
categories into which the class had been divided.3 5 This is a bold, as well as
34. On damage scheduling in mass tort cases, see David Rosenberg, Damage Scheduling in Mass
Exposure Cases, in 1 Courts, Health Science and the Law 335 (1991); damage scheduling in other tort cases
is proposed by James F. Blumstein, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, Beyond Tort Reform:
Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damagesfor Personal Injury, 8 YaleJ Reg 171, 177-86 (1991).
35. See Cimino v Raymark Indus., Civ No B-86-0456-CA (ED Tex 1990). The court of appeals
had issued a mandamus against a prior attempt at aggregative adjudication in the same case. In re
Fibreboard Corp., 893 F2d 706 (5th Cir 1990). Undaunted by the setback, the trial court proceeded
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unique, experiment. However, the odds are against it being sustained on
appeal or emulated by other courts.
Perhaps the most striking feature of a fixed valuation schedule of the sort
we propose would be the difference in treatment between the early and later
claims associated with the same mass tort. Of necessity the early claims would
have to be resolved by current procedures, because there would be no
previously resolved claims from which a set of claim categories could be
constructed. Once a sufficient number of claims had been tried or settled,
however, categories could be constructed and a fixed valuation schedule
could be employed. Early claimants would be subject to the full panoply of
conventional tort rights and constraints; decisions concerning liability,
causation, and damages would be individualized. By contrast, later claimants'
tort rights would be determined by the resolution of the earlier claims.
Similarly, the rights and liabilities of the defendant (or defendants) would be
conventionally "open" at the outset but subject to "closure" after a base of
early claims had been categorized.
How can this difference in treatment be justified? The only apparent
justification is an entirely practical and obvious one: in the absence of large
numbers of resolved claims, there is insufficient data to support the creation
of a fixed valuation schedule through the categorization of claimants and
claims. Under this view, there can be no presumption, either rebuttable or
conclusive, that the value of one claim is equal to the value of others in its
category unless there are large numbers of resolved claims to which the claim
6
can be compared.
It might follow that there can be no departure from individualized
adjudication through the use of aggregative or fixed valuation as long as the
size and components of any given tort claim are dependent on characteristics
unique either to that claimant or to the members of a group of similar
claimants. However, if fixed valuations are acceptable when they are based on
the resolution of an earlier set of similar claims, then the principle underlying
individualized adjudication in any tort claim is called into question. Were it
not for the absence of a set of previously resolved claims from which to create
a fixed valuation schedule, it might make sense to subject the early claims to a
fixed schedule of values as well. It may well be, then, that tort liability is
imposed on an individual basis and damages are assessed individually simply
because we have no other satisfactory way of doing so. Under this view,
with a revised plan, involving significantly more representative cases (a total of 160), but adhering to
the same basic aggregative format. Defendants again sought mandamus, but this time a different
panel of the Fifth Circuit refused to grant it. Appeal of the subsequent trial in Cimino is pending.
36. Thus, Francis McGovern's innovative approaches to the resolution of "mature" tort claims,
see McGovern, 69 BU L Rev 659 (cited in note 1), require that there be such a base of claims before
categorization can occur. David Rosenberg has proposed categorization as a matter of principle even
before a body of claims has matured, but even his proposal extends only to mass claims. Rosenberg,
69 BU L Rev at 713-26 (cited in note 9). Of course, any kind of damage scheduling, for mass claims
or conventional claims, entails practical problems of identifying a class of commensurable claims.
See Peter H. Schuck, Scheduling Damages and Insurance Contracts for Future Services: A Comment on
Blumstein, Bovbjerg and Sloan, 8 Yale J Reg 213, 217 (1991).
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individual adjudication of liability and damages becomes merely an
unavoidable inconvenience rather then a principled requirement of the
system.
Once the notion that individualized adjudication is required as a matter of
principle has been called into question, the special treatment that mass tort
claims has received also becomes problematic. The major argument for
special treatment is entirely practical: restricting claimants' access to court,
either through consensual or coercive methods, is expedient in mass tort
cases because the judicial system would be overwhelmed if it were forced to
treat mass tort claims like conventional, individual claims. It does not follow,
however, that conventional claims should be privileged at the expense of mass
claims. It is expedient to treat an avalanche of mass tort claims in a special
manner because the judicial system does not anticipate them; when these
claims are initiated, they seem special. But the processing burden these
claims place on the courts is not unique; the claims are simply the latest to be
filed. The burdens on the judicial system might be removed just as easily by
subjecting all conventional claims to special procedures as a matter of course
and permitting mass tort claimants unfettered access to individualized
adjudication. No principle would preclude such a reversal of priorities. Only
the difficulties of categorizing claims and applying fixed valuations in
conventional cases and anticipating mass tort case loads would stand in the
way.

37

In short, for those who have surrendered the idea that principle requires
individualized adjudication of either conventional or mass tort claims,
adopting something like a conclusive presumption that like claims have equal
value would simply be a problem of legal engineering. The main obstacle
would be finding a model to use in awarding nonindividualized damages; that
problem could be solved, however. For example, out-of-pocket losses usually
can be proved easily and paid periodically to avoid most factual disputes.
Assessing these losses would be "individualized," but nevertheless simple and
uncontroversial. For obvious reasons, fixing pain and suffering damages
would be a bit trickier. Assuming one were committed to compensating
claimants for pain and suffering,3 8 however, it should be possible to construct
some kind of valuation schedule indexed to the type of injury or to medical
costs. In theory, the liability determination itself would have to be
37. For just this reason, we foresee equal protection and due process challenges to any
substantially different treatment of mass tort and conventional tort claims, whether the treatment
consists of different evidentiary rules or the more radical, institutional reforms suggested here. Of
course, discriminating among victims of different classes of accidents lies at the heart of virtually all
modern legislation in this area, from comprehensive schemes like workers compensation to partial
reforms like automobile no-fault and medical malpractice reforms. Courts have generally had little
difficulty finding a rational basis for the discrimination. See, for example, New York Central RR v
White, 243 US 188, 37 S Ct 247 (1917) (workers' compensation); Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY 2d 41,
378 NYS 2d 1,340 NE 2d 444 (1975) (auto no-fault); Fein v Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal 3d 137,
211 Cal Rptr 368, 695 P2d 665 (1985) (medical malpractice reform).
38. Virtually all proposals for substitute compensation schemes eliminate pain and suffering, in
part because damages are difficult to schedule, but mostly to conserve insurance funds.
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adjudicated individually in conventional tort cases. Once uncertainty about
the magnitude of a claimant's damages were removed, however, in practice
there probably would be very few trials. At this point, consideration of the
use of a conclusive presumption about a claimant's damages would merge
with many of the proposals for general tort reform that have surfaced in
recent years.
What would remain of the traditional cause of action in tort if this
approach were adopted? The very notion of a tort action would simply be a
name given to the process of paying compensation according to a schedule
that bears only an attenuated relationship to the characteristics of particular
claims. Although this compensation might be paid in a setting that was
labelled "tort," in fact most of the characteristics that would identify that
setting as "tort" would have disappeared. The question would then become
whether these claims should disappear from courts of law as well.
III
THE USES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

A number of commentators have remarked on the similarity between the

mass tort claims facilities described in this symposium and administrative
programs. If the aggregative aims of these facilities were extended beyond
settlement to claims adjudications as we have suggested, adjudication would

come to resemble, mutatis mutandis, the administrative procedures used in
Social Security disability and workers' compensation programs. At this point,
the question arises whether the tort system would be so bureaucratized that it
would make sense to remove mass tort claims, entirely or partially, from the
courts.
Proposals to do just this are a venerable feature of the tort reform agenda,
with an ancestry that goes back to the first workers' compensation schemes.
Because most of these proposals have failed to gain acceptance, 39 however,
40
new social insurance programs such as the Social Security disability system
typically supplement rather than supplant the common law tort system.
Undaunted by this lack of past acceptance, advocates of administrative
systems are finding fresh support for some such reform from their experience
4
with mass tort claims. '

At the outset we need to examine whether and how to change, first, the
substantive legal standards of liability and compensation, and, second, the
39. The most prominent example of the successful proposals are the auto no-fault plans
adopted in fourteen states. Also at the state level, both Virginia and Florida have recently adopted
no-fault programs to compensate the victims of birth-related neurological injury. See Va Code Ann
§§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie, 1990); Fla Stat §§ 766.301 to .316 (West, 1990). At the federal level,
the Black Lung program, 30 USC §§ 901-45 (1988), and the National Vaccine Program, 42 USC
§ 300aa-1-34 (Supp V 1987), are examples of such approaches.
40. For a description and analysis, see Jerry L. Mashaw, AdministrativeJustice (Yale U Press, 1983).
41. Sugarman, 73 Cal L Rev at 596-603 (cited in note 29). Compare Kenneth S. Abraham,
Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 Va L Rev 845, 883-98
(1987) (analyzing the feasibility of creating a compensation fund for mass torts).
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processes by which the relevant standards are applied. The first issue entails
far-reaching questions of social purpose, including questions concerning the
goals of the tort system and its effects. In part we have already addressed this
first issue in analyzing the possible use of claim profiles in adjudication. The
second issue involves rather more limited, and more focused, instrumental
questions of implementation. The two issues are obviously interrelated; for
instance, a goal of corrective justice might be thought to imply a certain type
of process for evaluating particular claims. 42 Nevertheless, the second issue

must be analyzed separately.
Specifically, that issue is whether and how administrative mechanisms
might be used within the basic structure of the tort system, that is, within the
framework of its essential functions. The settlement procedures discussed in
this symposium are a step in this direction, as is our proposed extension of the
aggregative valuation process to adjudicated cases. One might think of the
basic design as being similar to the way in which administrative agencies
determine the parameters of individual cases through the use of rulemaking. 43
Perhaps the closest precedent from administrative law is the use of
standardized criteria-the so-called "grid system"-for determining disability
under the Social Security disability program. 44 The basic idea of using rules
to delimit the scope of adjudicatory contests is not inherently more an
attribute of the administrative process than the judicial process, however. For
instance, the use of sentencing guidelines in federal criminal cases 4 5 parallels
the Social Security grid system and our proposed use of claim profiles.
More generally, the principle of stare decisis is based on the supremacy of
rules over open-ended dispute resolution. Stare decisis, however, is only
infrequently used, as courts are hesitant to use it to foreclose controversies in
which litigants' claims appear to be distinctive. 4 6 Still, this is as much the
product of judges' cautiousness as it is an inherent principle of the judicial
process.
Nevertheless, we must be wary of formalistic thinking about the judicial
and administrative processes, or for that matter about courts and agencies. A

claim does not belong in court merely because it looks more like a tort claim
than any other conventional right to compensation. By the same token, we
42. This seems to be the implication of Ernest Weinrib's view of corrective justice. See ErnestJ.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale LJ 949, 974 (1988).
43. See, for example, United States v Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 US 192 (1956) (affirming the
validity of this process against a challenge that it deprived individual parties their right to a hearing
on the foreclosed issues).
44. See Heckler v Campbell, 461 US 458 (1983) (sustaining Health and Human Services ("HHS")
medical-vocational guidelines in disability cases against a due process challenge). The disability
guidelines were directed to problems quite similar to those raised by mass tort claims; in addition to
the management problem of disposing of huge numbers of individual claims, HHS was confronted
with what it deemed unreasonable variation among administrative law judge determinations. Of
course, the scale of the problem in the disability context is several orders of magnitude larger than in
the torts context, the former involving several million claims per year.
45. See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361 (1989) (affirming the constitutionality of the federal
sentencing commission).
46. See, for example, Migues v FibreboardCorp., 662 F2d 1182, 1187-89 (5th Cir 1981).
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should not banish a set of claims from court merely because they do not look
like conventional tort claims. As for mass tort claims, it is arguable that they
do not belong with other tort claims because, at least in terms of numbers of
claimants, mass tort claims are generally more akin to, for example, claims for
black lung disease than conventional product accident cases.
There are three obstacles, however, to an approach that would relegate
mass tort claims, such as the Dalkon Shield, Agent Orange, and asbestos
claims, to administrative systems. As we cannot explore these obstacles, and
possible ways to surmount them, in detail, we shall simply identify several of
their salient aspects.
First, there is presently no all-purpose mass-accident claims agency to
handle mass tort claims. The claims fall into the tort system not simply
because we call them "torts," but because we have no other system with
exclusive jurisdiction available to handle them. 4 7 One solution would be to
construct some kind of generic mass accident agency/system to deal with
these problems as they arise. It is difficult, however, to visualize the contours
of such a program without concrete information and experience produced by
the emergence of the claims themselves. Even demarcating the general scope
of such a program is problematic: what would qualify as a "mass accident"?
Second, the task of constructing an efficient and fair claims process for
undefined future accidents is vexing. The history of mass tort actions teaches
us that leaving claim determinations in the judicial system creates incentives
for investigation that probably would be weaker in an administrative setting.
Private attorneys representing their clients in successions of cases in the early
stages of mass tort litigation involving the Dalkon Shield and asbestos were
responsible for uncovering information relevant to both liability and
causation that might never have emerged within another institutional
structure. We would be reluctant to sacrifice the social benefits derived from
these prospecting incentives. Nevertheless, it might be possible to continue
to rely on the judicial system to make what we have called "front-end"
determinations of liability and general causation, and then to transfer the
"back-end" tasks of allocating compensation to an administrative agency.
This bifurcation of responsibility would not necessarily compromise the
positive incentives created by the tort system. The procedure created for
arranging the transfer-for instance an order of a special judicial panelcould also provide for recognizing and rewarding the entrepreneurial
48
contributions of attorneys.
The question remains whether the agency would employ standards for
resolving disputed claims that are the same as or different from those of the
47. Of course, many of the claims are handled non-exclusively by the tort system acting in
tandem with such nontort systems as workers' compensation, Social Security disability, and health
insurance.
48. This task need not be greatly different from current practice in judicial approvals of mass
tort class action settlements. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litzgation, 611 F Supp 1296,
1311-12 (ED NY 1985) (recognizing the need to create incentives to bring meritorious suits but
cautioning that "contingency multipliers" should not be made in cases of borderline merit).

Page 137: Autumn 1990]

AGGREGATIVE VALUATION

tort system. We assume the standards employed in an administrative system
would be somewhat different, simpler, and perhaps more focused on basic
elements of compensatory need than those in the tort system. Without some
such simplification, it is difficult to see the point of the transfer, for without
simplified standards, the purely procedural differences between agency and
49
court adjudications would probably not be enough to warrant the transfer.
Third, even if a reformed mass tort claim processing agency were
implemented, a satisfactory definition of its jurisdiction were developed, and
the desirability of continuing to make front-end determinations in judicial
proceedings were recognized, serious "switching" problems could arise.
That is, the main technical problem is that it is by no means clear that the
appropriate conditions for transfer could be specified in advance. The
settlement facilities that have been used thus far to handle the back-end
functions of claims determinations have been ad hoc structures designed to
deal specifically with a defined set of cases.
Bifurcating adjudication would present more than mere technical
problems. Eliminating the right to a jury trial on the individual damages
claims also presents a serious constitutional issue. Complete displacement of
the entire tort claim in favor of an administrative scheme presumably would
be constitutional. 50 However, retaining the basic tort action for generic issues
while transferring the individual adjudication of damages to an agency might
run afoul of the seventh amendment or its counterparts in state
constitutions. 5' In fact, in a large sense, each sequence of moves we have
outlined here can be viewed as a progressive sequence of limitations on jury
prerogatives. 52 However, we think it is only at the stage where the jury is
49. The principal difference is accounted for by the use of juries in court cases, and the
evidentiary restrictions that attend jury use. However, as our proposed use of collective claims data
suggests, jury trials can be made to resemble administrative adjudication.
50. The workers' compensation cases are the most directly relevant precedent. See, for
example, Mountain Timber Co. v Washington, 243 US 219 (1917). Compare Atlas Roofing Co. v
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 US 442 (1977) (upholding nonjury adjudication of
"public right" claims).
51. In Tull v United States, 481 US 412, 426 n9 (1987), the Supreme Court suggested that
remedies in a civil case may not require jury determination. However, the fact that Tull involved a
congressionally created action arguably distinguishes it from common law cases. See Granfinanciera,
S.A. v Nordberg, 109 S Ct 2782 (1989) (distinguishing between "public right" and "private right"
claims for purposes of determining the applicability of the seventh amendment). If the transfer of
claims were to a federal agency-the most plausible scenario-Article III problems might also be
raised under the precedent of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 US 50
(1982) (adjudication of common law contract claims by non-Article III judge unconstitutional).
However, the Court's more recent decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US
833 (1986) (upholding delegation of power to non-Article III agency to adjudicate state law claims),
suggests to us that Article III would not be an important obstacle to such a transfer of adjudicatory
authority.
52. Viewing jury discretion as the core problem, one may fairly ask (some of our colleagues have
asked) why we should concentrate our attention on reforming adjudication of mass torts when the
problem equally arises in all tort adjudication-indeed, reaches beyond tort law. Our answer, by way
of confession and avoidance, is that juries may well present large problems throughout tort law, but
the "jury problem," if we can call it that, is not a matter of equal concern across this entire domain.
For present purposes, we think it is enough that juries create special difficulties in the resolution of
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bypassed, within a scheme that retains its common law character, that the
constitutional question becomes important.
Constitutional questions aside, the transfer of individual claims
adjudication to an agency would raise fairness concerns. Admittedly, as a
practical matter, claims transferred to an administrative system would end up
being treated very much as they are now treated by settlement facilities. Each
forum would use the same aggregative methods. Nonetheless, the possibility,
however theoretical, that a claim could be presented to a court may be
important to the parties' perceptions of fairness. Of course, amending the
courts' own traditional processes to incorporate aggregative methods of
claims evaluation along the lines we have suggested may weaken the parties'
preference for the judicial process. In other words, having compromised the
system this far, it might become-logically it should become-a matter of
indifference whether claims are determined by a court (jury) or an agency.
But logic does not count for everything. Even if our recommendations
were accepted and much of the individualized adjudication so characteristic of
conventional tort litigation were removed from mass tort actions, the allure of
judicial supervision of the process would remain. Although an effective
mechanism might eventually be constructed for switching back-end issues to
an agency after resolution of front-end issues in court, the agency would lack

the symbolic qualities that the courts-even when they are thrust into the role
of bureaucrats-have managed to retain. 53 It is difficult at this stage to say
whether it would be worthwhile to compromise the judicial system at the backend to retain the virtues of adjudicating front-end issues in court. It is clear,
however, that no shift of even the back-end issues from the courts to an
agency could escape the concern for symbol that even the bureaucratization
of mass tort litigation has not extinguished.
IV
CONCLUSION

The stress mass tort litigation places on the legal system is not the only
challenge posed by such litigation. In addition, the effort to fashion fair and
effective methods of resolving mass tort claims has begun to call into question
the assumptions that lie behind the legal system's approach to conventional
tort claims. It is difficult to think about the proper role of mass tort claims
facilities without also considering the proper scope of mass tort law itself. It is
also difficult to think about the proper scope of mass tort law without
considering whether the bureaucratization of adjudication that almost
inevitably occurs in mass tort cases argues in favor of transferring at least
mass tort claims, difficulties that can be constructively addressed independently of other areas of the

law.
53. These qualities include the right to have a decision made by a judge and jury, with all the
formalities conventionally associated with judicial trials, as well as the opportunity to put defendants
"in the dock" and require them to answer plaintiffs' charges. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Authority in
the Dock, 69 BU L Rev 469 (1989).
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some of the traditional functions of the courts in tort litigation to the
administrative process.
In short, unless we know what we want a mass tort claims facility to
accomplish, we cannot know how it should operate. Our proposals in this
article are frankly provocative in their aim. They are intended to stimulate
thinking about these aims and to sketch several methods that might loosen the
constraints on mass tort claims facilities; it is not our ambition to formulate a
definitive solution to all the problems of mass claims administration. Indeed,
even thinking about these problems brings to mind Mark Twain's
reminiscence on being instructed about the need to learn the contours of the
Mississippi shoreline:
My boy, you've got to know the shape of the river perfectly. It is all there is left to steer
by on a very dark night ....
You take a night when there's one of these grisly, drizzly,

gray mists, and then there isn't any particular shape to a shore. A gray mist would
tangle the head of the oldest man that ever lived. Well, then, different kinds of

moonlight change the shape of the river in different ways. You see ....
Oh, don't say any more, please! Have I got to learn the shape of the river according to
all these five hundred thousand different ways? If I tried to carry all that cargo in my
head it would make me stoop-shouldered.5-

54.

Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi 64-65 (Harper & Row, 1917; original ed 1874).

